Thursday, December 29, 2011

Quick Hit on Index Linked GICs

I know I said my next blog would be on fund fees however I wanted to acknowledge a great article by John Heinzl in the Globe today. It fits into the investor education debate that is ongoing.

Why the Blue Chip GIC isn’t a blue chip investment

Investor Education: I noted a great article in the G&M today by John Heinzl. For those that do not follow John, he is one of the best writers when it comes to both understanding and explaining investment products and strategies. His topic was a follow-up on one he wrote when BMO introduced its unfortunate “Blue Chip GIC” product. John felt it was a product designed to heavily favour bank profits and was highly unlikely to be a great product for the clients of BMO who were sold this product. Note John made this call a year ago!
John had explained the basics of the product and how the structure was likely to work against clients expecting a reasonable return from a product offering “guarantee of principle” but little in the way of upside returns. Not surprisingly, the GIC paid investors a paltry 0.2% for a one year term. We thank John for the follow up article as it clearly shows not just that the product was a poor performer; but more importantly it shows how predictable the poor results were. John “forecast” the performance as opposed to merely stating it after the fact. Thanks John!
For investor advocates, John’s original comments were no surprise and the performance of the GIC was equally predictable. BMO is not alone in this cynical exploiting of investors through “index linked GICs”. TD bank also pushes staff to maximize the sales of these products and rewards those who do so. So does most every other bank in Canada. The marketing pitch is to play on the fear that markets are unpredictable and that investors should try to keep their money safe. Given the losses generated by mutual funds over the past few years, one would expect that many investors are ripe for this sales pitch. The reason the pitch works is based upon a few key investor attributes:

1-      Most investors trust bank employees and do not realize that most bank employees do not understand how the actual investments work.

2-      Investors are not educated or trained to understand the full impact of the underlying terms and conditions on these complex products. What the investor hears is “GIC” and “guaranteed”. The belief is that any market gains will increase returns and any losses will be absorbed by the bank. Unfortunately that is not the case! The underlying terms were designed to minimize payouts such that even a positive average return on the underlying stocks would not necessarily generate a bonus. In effect, the game was tilted in favour of the bank.

3-      In general, the more complex the product, the larger the profit margin is for the bank. This suggests that the bank benefits from having both the staff and the client uninformed.

With the banks all pretending to support investor education, this is a practical example of why you cannot believe the basic information provided by your trusted local banker. The issue is that the employee does as they are told/trained in the belief their employer would not treat customers unfairly.
The customer in turn trusts that the local bank employee would never do anything that would treat a loyal customer unfairly. In fact, a highly paid bank executive signed off on the product because it generates much higher bank profit than a conventional GIC....period! Client investment returns or “fairness” never enters the picture for the executive. So long as it is possible to market a scenario where the client might have done better with the “linked GIC” the bankers can sleep at night without acknowledging how unlikely a positive outcome is for most clients. If a client complains the banker will simply suggest the GIC was better than if the client had actually bought the stocks and lost much of their investment capital. Of course the problem with that answer is that the client never intended to buy the underlying stock! They went to the bank to buy a simple GIC and were sold this crap instead!
Beware bankers bearing gifts!


Friday, December 16, 2011

Why Mutual Funds are like Popcorn

 Why Mutual Funds are like Popcorn!

The Canadian mutual fund industry runs on the theory that Canadian investors will voluntarily pay annual fees to mutual fund salespeople in return for selling a mutual fund and providing advice. The main players in this business are a) the investor, b) the mutual fund company, and c) the salesperson.
The key to implementing this strategy has been to ensure that the investor is not provided with either a minimum service standard for the “advice” component nor a summary of the fees being paid for the “advice” service.

If we focus on the retail investor; the investor is paying an annual MER which covers everybody’s expenses and profits. In fact, the investor is the only source of money and the only person who is not guaranteed a profit every year. As such, we can conclude the embedded cost of the “advice” is equal to the fee paid by the investor less all expenses involved in fund manufacturing and sales.

Formula: Investor Cost is defined as: MER= manufacturing cost + sales cost + advice costs

The Advice: When fund companies talk about “advice” being provided they do not attempt to  explain why the advice would need to be facilitated through the fund company’s salesman. Since fund companies are not promoted as being in the business of providing advice, it would seem that the advice component would be a distraction from the core business of managing money. Fund companies do have expertise in managing investments and that is where they are most efficient. In many cases the fund company will outsource the “advice” component to an independent salesperson. These salespeople generally call themselves “financial planners” or “advisors”, although these titles mean nothing specific in terms of knowledge. The “advice” component is non-defined in terms of either quality or frequency of the advice investors should receive. As such the salesperson does not need to meet any standard for advice nor confirm any advice has been provided in order to collect the advice fee. In fact, the commission for providing the advice is often paid to the salesperson up front before any follow up advice service would be expected to take place.
COGS: Fund companies are in the manufacturing business. As such the fund companies are fully aware of the accounting term “COGS” or cost of goods sold. The COGS for a fund company is likely in the order of 0.4-0.5% based upon the wholesale pricing that is available. Some would argue the number is more likely between 0.2-0.4% but let’s assume the higher number to be conservative. Adding a margin for strong profits, the manufacturing company can thrive on a price of 0.7%. This is on the high side of the estimated cost range and provides a profit margin of 75%-100%.
 Having solved for what appears to be a generous but reasonable manufacturing cost, the formula can be updated as below:

Investor Costs (MER) = manufacturing cost + sales cost + advice cost

                                    = 0.7% + sales costs +advice costs

Sales: Mutual fund manufacturers also need to sell their product. The cost of the sales process varies based upon the sales channel(s) the company uses to distribute their funds. Some companies such as Steadyhand sell manufactured products directly to investors. As such, a large investor can achieve MERs as low as 0.77% for a Canadian equity fund and just below 1% on foreign equity funds. Steadyhand is not a manufacturer, but is a low cost distributor of custom funds they create through investment management firms who provide wholesale services to Steadyhand. Steadyhand does not utilize an “advisor” sales force, but handles sales via phone and internet which is lower cost and quite efficient.
Alternatively, bank mutual funds are sold by a “captive” sales channel. The bank’s employees are most often salaried and the salary cost is spread across multiple product lines. This sales channel is low cost and efficient as the banks’ leverage internet sales, discount brokerage sales and branch staff sales. TD bank offers a balanced mutual fund through its e-series for 1.28%. The e-series does not provide an advice component so the fee is comparable to Steadyhand. The Steadyhand pricing reflects a small focused sales channel approach, while TD represents a large multi-channel sales approach, neither of which is advice focused.
The combined manufacturing and sales channel costs for Steadyhand  are assumed to be mid way between the lowest Canadian and foreign equity MERs. Subtracting the 0.7% manufacturing cost leaves a sales channel cost of 0.14% ( 0.84 - 0.7 = 0.14%).  TD sales costs using the balanced fund as the average would be 0.58% (1.28-0.7= 0.58%). Let’s assume the sales channel expense of a fund company is on the higher end of the range provided by the two examples, and we can set sales channel expenses at 0.5%. Our formula now looks like this:
Investor Costs         = 0.7 + 0.5 + advice costs.
Given the average MER for Canadian equity funds is approximately 2.4%, the formula can be solved as follows:
Investor costs= manufacturing cost + sales cost + advice cost
2.4% = 0.7% + 0.5% +advice cost
Advice cost= 2.4% - 0.7% -0.5% = 1.2%
The advice component is thus valued at 1.2%. That is half the cost of a typical equity fund MER in Canada. In effect, if this is correct, fund companies are in the primary business of selling advice since it accounts for the largest component of their MER fee.
U.S. Comparison: If we were to use an example of typical U.S. mutual fund fees the formula appears to work reasonably well. Based upon an average MER of 1.4% for US equity mutual funds the formula looks like this:
Investor costs= manufacturing cost + sales cost + advice cost
1.4% = 0.7% + 0.5 % + 0.2%
The advice cost is 0.2% and the fund companies are definitely in the primary business of manufacturing and selling investment funds. If we assume U.S. funds have a lower cost environment and economies of scale, the advice component may be as high as 0.3%-0.4%, but it is still the smaller component of the various fees in our formula. Regarding economies of scale, the Canadian fund firms manage hundreds of billions of dollars in mutual funds yet the largest firms such as Investors Group have amongst the highest fees. This suggests economies of scale are not passed down the line by fund companies in Canada.
Popcorn Theory: A similar approach can be used to look at the movie theatre business. This comparison would provide a glimpse of what may be wrong with the conclusion that fund companies are really charging fees for “advice” as opposed to investment skills.
When my wife and I head to the theatre it is for the express purpose of seeing a movie. We understand the evening will cost a set amount of money and we are prepared to spend accordingly. We do not divide the cost of the event into “movie cost” and “snack costs”. We understand we will have popcorn, a soft drink and we will watch the movie and it will cost around $30.00 for the evening.
The theatre owner, however, does care how we spend our money. Movie theatres make extremely large profits from selling popcorn. Expenses in preparing popcorn are very low, popcorn profit margins are very high, and little skill is needed to train staff. The actual movies by contrast are expensive to make and thus  expensive for a theatre to purchase. Movies can be big winners or they can be expensive duds for the theatre owner. On the surface, it would appear the theatre owner would be better off if they focused on selling popcorn and not on the low margin movie component of the business. However, here is the catch: in real life nobody would travel to a theatre just to buy popcorn. The movie is the sizzle that creates the opportunity to sell the popcorn! Without the movie there is no opportunity to distribute the extremely profitable popcorn!
 Applying the popcorn theory to the investment business; few investors would buy mutual funds without the confidence they were getting valuable investment and planning advice. In essence, investors do not seek mutual funds, they seek advice!

 The fund companies know that the "advice" component attracts investors who otherwise would not purchase mutual funds. The "advice" performs the same function as the "movie" does.... it attracts clients who can then be sold a very profitable secondary product. In the case of investors, the very profitable secondary product is the mutual fund.
 Further proof that this comparison is correct is found in the high volume of expensive mutual funds sold with an advice commission, versus the much smaller sales volume of lower cost, direct sale mutual funds. Investors overpay for the mutual fund to get the perceived advice they are seeking.  The main difference is moviegoers know what the popcorn costs them while investors face a hidden "advice fee" buried in the MER costs.
In the next blog we will delve a little deeper into why the Canadian mutual fund fee model does not make sense and how that contributes to Canada's exorbitant mutual fund fees.

Sunday, December 4, 2011

A discussion on Risk

RISK: Deviation from an Expected Outcome!

The current economic climate is the perfect backdrop to an examination of the “four letter word” most likely to scare an investor today! Risk is the most misunderstood word in investing and yet we all seem to believe we know what the word means in most every other context. “Drink & Drive” and you risk injury, death, increased insurance rates, public condemnation and potential fine and jail time. If you do not wear a hard hat on a construction site you risk injury or death. These seem obvious as well they should. So why is it that investing is different? Well there is one very significant reason for this: in the scenarios listed above you cannot imagine a potential profit that would make the risk worthwhile. Is saving a taxi fare worth a death; is saving the cost of a hard hat worth being paralyzed in a construction accident? Of course not! Attaching the concept to “reward” to “risk” causes emotions to become involved. Add a thousand different opinions on “market risk” from a thousand talking heads and it makes your head hurt to even try to quantify risk.

Investing is one of only a very few areas where “risk” is directly associated with “reward”. In economic theory any investment return greater than that of a “90 day treasury bill” is considered “return on risk”. Investment managers measure “risk adjusted return” on a portfolio or security. Investors often act as if the expression “no risk, no reward” was a balanced equation. In fact, taking risk can enhance returns but taking risk does not ensure enhanced returns.  MF Global Holdings is a hedge fund that most recently learnt this tough lesson when it invested in “high risk” Euro bonds and lost billions in a few short weeks. The lesson here is that professional investors quite often ignore risk and the results can be devastating....  not for the investment manager, but for the investors who provided the money! Risk is NOT owned by the “manager” but by those who provide the capital!

Risks are wide and varied when it comes to investments. In fact, there are so many different risks that the mutual fund industry has undertaken a strategy of hiding risk from the investor rather than spend a ton of time explaining the risks. The fund investment industry has lobbied hard to ensure the Point of Sale Disclosure document will report only a singular risk factor to investors. This type of misleading information is based upon the widely held belief by fund executives that investors are too dumb to understand more than one simple thought at a time. Unfortunately the securities administrators who vet the POS document have taken a pro-fund company approach and ignored investor needs. This is not surprising since the securities administrators are a cozy group of insiders who spend significant time with fund executives and next to no time with normal investors.

Risk Factors: The risks listed below are a small sample of what risks lie out there for investors. It is not in any order of importance but is meant to provoke questions when investors are looking to buy securities/funds.

Price volatility: The amount a fund/security varies in price is a measure of the swings you might expect in the value of a fund you invest in. In short, if a fund has a history of values rising or falling by as much as 30% in a given period, then that fund has twice the risk of losses compared to a fund that tends to fluctuate by 15% up or down in the same period. The typical fluctuation for each security or fund is measured by the “standard deviation” of returns and is generally represented by a “bell curve” of probable outcomes. Most of us will remember bell curves being used to standardize test results so that a predetermined average outcome is obtained on test scores. This approach to measuring risk makes a ton of sense if you ignore the warning that comes with every fund prospectus that “past performance is not indicative of future performance”. A simple way to express the short comings of this approach is to look at the past experience of a turkey in the year prior to Thanksgiving. Every morning the farmer feeds and cares for turkey so in the days leading up to Thanksgiving, the turkey would see the farmer as being of no risk to the turkey! For 364 days the performance of the Farmer shows no variance! Like the turkey discovers on day 365, a lot can change in a day even if past history has not prepared us for the change. However, as a general rule it is good to know the volatility of a fund before you invest so long as you do not look at the information in isolation and suddenly become a turkey for the slaughter one day.

a-       A subset of this volatility risk is “event risk”. Like Thanksgiving to the turkey, certain events occur which alter the volatility measure for a security/fund. Since a 1 yr, 3 yr, or 5 yr horizon will not likely capture all the possible or even likely “events”, it is a fact that risk will be understated. This chronic understatement is exposed when a black swan or flat tail event occurs. For example, a tsunami wipes out a Japanese nuclear plant and uranium producers see their stock values plummet as nuclear energy is exposed as having more risk than suggested by the standard deviation in price volatility. While advisor/salespeople will shrug and say you cannot foresee such an event, in fact tsunamis in Japan are a well known fact and both Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents had the same effect on uranium markets. These events are plausible but hard to predict accurately over the short term but not over the long term. Most time periods used for standard deviation are very short term and in many cases the time period is manipulated to provide a desired outcome.

Market Risk: Market risk is considered a systemic risk and thus cannot be easily avoided.  In recent times we have learnt a lesson on the importance of correlations. Prior to 2008 we had forgotten that in a terrible recession all securities can drop together and the past price volatility of securities means little or nothing. While diversification can add value in many instances; when the whole market decides to move in unison even the best past price history or quality business model can get trashed. Contrary to market advisors, sometimes a falling knife is dangerous and not a buying opportunity. Interestingly, a group of wise money managers have created a strategy around bucking the market as ‘contrarian investors”. Equally, a different set of wise money managers have created a strategy of buying into market movements as “momentum investors”. Typically one side will guess right and claim they are truly wise and the other side will fail and bide their time until they eventually guess right and can reclaim the status of “wise investors”. Either way, market movement is a real risk for all investors.

a-      “Market risk” is very hard to measure in the short term. A number of managers claim they have the secret formula to understanding market moves and they provide advice based upon “market timing”. This is generally a macro strategy that claims to understand future market moves based upon a series of trends or analytics. In fact, given the number of salespeople who perpetually recommend buying securities in every market it is very likely that market timing is a sales strategy more often than an investment strategy. Guess wrong and the losses can be huge.

Political Risk: Those Canadians that piled money into the expanding income trust markets will know exactly what I mean by political risk. One simple regulatory change can wipe billions in supposed value from the markets. I say “supposed value” because in the case of income trusts, the value being created was not a reflection of a business strategy or performance, but was rather a combination of business value plus a regulatory tax value. Unfortunately investors were sold on the notion that the price was a reflection of simple business value. Something every analyst knew was false. When the tax laws changed many investors claimed the government caused the market losses. In fact the government created the value through poor tax laws and corrected the values by fixing the tax loophole. The decision was clearly political but the risk was financial. Common political risks include countries such as Venezuela nationalizing oil assets or the Congo extorting funds from mining companies. These risks tend to appear suddenly and cause rapid drops in stock/fund prices. Some political events are hard to predict such as the collapse of a government while others are well known risks such as war in the Middle East disrupting oil prices. A more recent political risk was the failure of the U.S. to approve the Keystone XL Pipeline expansion which caused shares in pipeline companies to drop.

a-      A subset of political risk is “country risk”. Certain countries are prone to a combination of regulatory risk, government changes, civil wars and trade embargos that affect securities issued in the country. A rash of kidnappings in a country can result in companies closing down foreign operations and losing revenue streams vital to the company. Whole regions can be affected in some areas such as the Middle East, when a single country has a significant political or military event.

Advisor Risk:

The number one risk to your investment success and often your retirement success is   “advisor risk”. The vast majority of “advisors” are using a title they have not earned and should not be using. Most people who sell securities are licensed as “sales representatives” but utilize the terms “advisor” or “planner” to self describe their functions. In fact, the vast majority of sales people are licensed ONLY to sell Mutual Funds. As such they can sell you a fund managed by somebody else, and typically can offer very basic financial advice. Obtaining a license to sell Mutual Funds is quite easy and requires very little additional education on either financial planning or portfolio management. The typical “planner” is trained by a fund company on how to “sell” funds. The complexity in the job is around issues such as maximizing commission revenue, sales pitches to convince investors that high MER fees are acceptable and that deferred sales penalties are a good way to purchase funds. The fact is that the business is taught to sales people by the companies who benefit from commissions the most. As such many salespeople actually do not understand the damage they can do by selling high cost funds or complex funds. Investors learned this lesson the hard way when the U.S. asset backed commercial paper market became illiquid in 2008. Sales people had unwittingly sold funds holding ABCP as no-risk money market funds or fixed income products. The fact is, that most salespeople are not qualified to make the decision on what was a safe fund and they just sold what their fund firms told them to! Combine that with the fact most are not licensed to sell  alternative products such as exchange traded funds, stocks or bonds, and you can see how the “advisor”/salesperson  has no choice but to believe that the funds they sell are a great solution for every client.

Advisor performance is difficult to determine as, unlike investment counselling firms, the salespeople who sell funds or non-discretionary stocks and bonds do not provide audited performance results for their clients. Typically only “investment counsellors” working on a discretionary basis can do so.  So basically investors choose an advisor based upon the recommendation of other uninformed investors. While that sounds harsh, the other investors are uninformed because the mutual fund firms refuse to inform them. As an example fund firms generally refuse to provide:

-          A clear rate of return for each investor every quarter or year (the return of the fund rarely equals the return received by the investor, which studies show to be consistently lower than the funds stated returns)

-          A measure of how the fund performed against the normal benchmarks used by investment managers (ex. how did your Canadian Equity fund perform against the TSX 60 index?)

-          A monthly, quarterly or annual summary of fees paid to the fund by the investor

-          A similar summary of commissions paid from the MER to the sales person each period

-          An accurate asset allocation for the portfolios held by a fund investor ( mutual funds are not an asset class despite what many statements claim)

Interest Rate Risk:  The values of many securities are sensitive to changes in interest rates. The classic example is Fixed Income securities such as bonds. Once a bond has a set coupon rate (the percent paid out to investors each year), any increase in current interest rates will cause bond values to drop as new bond purchasers will seek the higher current coupon rates/ payouts that are available. Any decrease in current interest rates will cause bond values to rise as investors are willing to pay a bonus rather than accept the lower coupon rates that are the new norm. This risk is measured by “duration” and typically the longer the term of a bond the higher the duration measure is on a bond. Other securities such as preferred shares will often reflect the same general fluctuations since they trade predominantly on the payout levels fixed to the security. On a more macro level, when interest rates are higher or equity prices are extremely volatile, money may move out of the equity markets and into the generally less volatile fixed income markets. In today’s market we are hearing the terms “risk-on” and “risk-off” to reflect capital flows into and out of equity markets respectively. With current interest rates at historic lows, the risk of a significant interest rate increase makes long term bonds susceptible to greater price risk.

Management Risk: Funds are generally managed by a professional portfolio manager. The manager or management team will make the crucial decisions on when and what to purchase in a fund. The track record of the fund manager is often the major selling feature of a fund. When the key decision maker decides to leave a fund the investment decisions are made by a new fund manager. Given the abilities of the fund managers to attract investors, the fund can often lose a large number of investors if the manager changes. This can require funds to sell securities at a bad time and incur losses. Also, the track record of the fund is used in the marketing material even though the new manager has no ownership of the track record. What often makes this even worse is that sales people lock investors into a deferred sales penalty that can prevent them from following the fund manager that they were told was the reason the original investment was made.

Fraud: the risk of an investor being defrauded is higher than it should be in Canada. The reason is that the Canadian securities regulators are ineffective. Billion dollar frauds such as Bre-X and Nortel occur with no significant action by the regulators. Numerous frauds have occurred in Canada over the past decade and many are by firms who operate with no regulatory oversight right under the noses of our watchdogs. The best an investor can do is to confirm the licensing of the investment firm with a regulatory body such as IIROC or IFIC or the OSC. The most recent issue suggesting fraud is the Sino-Forest debacle which happened while the OSC was napping. Expect more frauds until some regulatory action is taken to curb the profits of the fraudsters.

Foreign Exchange Risk: Investors who buy securities in a currency that is different than the currency they use to fund the investment will have foreign exchange risk. In the case of Europe we can see the high risk currently associated with the value of the Euro versus the Canadian Dollar. If I buy a European security denominated in Euros and the Euro drops 5% against the Canadian dollar, then my investment loss on selling the security at the same price I bought it is 5% plus any sales fees. Investors have seen the Canadian dollar fluctuate strongly against the American dollar. A share bought when the Canadian dollar was worth $0.67 required almost $1.5 CDN dollars to buy one US dollar worth of shares. If it was sold when the Canadian dollar was at par the same share returned only $1 CDN dollar. Foreign exchange risk can be removed with currency hedging strategies but it does have a cost in increased expenses for the hedging.

Many investors take a simple view of risk and thus underestimate the consequences. This tends to show up in portfolios in a number of predictable ways: too much equity, too much low quality fixed income products (high yield), too many complex securities, and fees which are far higher than they should be. Many of these risks should be dealt with by a competent investment sales person. Unfortunately there are very few quality investment sales people in the industry and even fewer who do not have a conflict of interest due to the commission structure used in Canada. The above list of risks is not exhaustive. Issues around liquidity and leveraging risk are two more examples of risks that come to mind when I reflect on portfolios I have reviewed. It is difficult to make a comprehensive list that covers everything. In fact it would be overwhelming to read such a risk. In ending I will just say “risk needs to be understood and managed not totally avoided”. It is never the bus you are waiting for that runs you over, it is the one you did not see coming! Demand your sales person better understand the risks in what they sell and ask questions until you are satisfied you understand the whole picture.
sois mike

p.s. Sorry for the long delay between posts!

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

NEWSFLASH OBSI In Critical Condition

 Canada:  Banks Stomp OBSI to Near Death

“In a shocking news development, we get word that a gang of extremely large, powerful and petulant banks have stomped the current Ombudsman for Investments to near death”!

In investigating the disturbing allegations we, like most Canadians, are confused as to why such large and powerful beasts would suddenly turn on such a small, frail, and youthful position.
For those requiring more background, the OBSI is the “ombudsman for banking services and investments”. This position was formed in the late 1990s when rumours were heard about a rampaging group of banks beating up small business owners and stealing their lunch money. No charges were laid as the surviving small business owners were hesitant to risk future lunch money. In 2002 the OBSI added the investment industry to its mandate; attempting to provide fair resolution to small retail investors who wondered how their current lunch money and future lunch reserves (RRSPs) had seemingly disappeared from their investment accounts. Of course many of these nest eggs were “prudently” invested by the gorillas in the Investment industry including of course the bank gang.

Many speculate that adding the investment bullies to the mandate of the ombudsman was short-sighted. Like a British police constable, the ombudsman carries no weapons when confronting these wild marauding gangs. Apparently the governments of the day felt that moral suasion and a proper upbringing would keep the gangs in line. Unfortunately, it would appear that power and greed have tilted the scale away from any fear of public condemnation. The large powerful bank investment firms appear to actually believe that whatever they do is always correct and any opposition is to be immediately crushed!
 In fairness, it appears that the ombudsman did not even get his weapon (public disclosure) out of his holster before he was set upon. Despite clear warnings of the dangers, the ombudsman actually thought he was a respected friend of the gangs and appears to have walked into the back alley willingly and without back-up.  One can only wonder at his surprise when the organized criticisms began raining down on his unprotected skull. Early word from investor advocates familiar with the case is that the ombudsman was guilty of having his own opinion on both the veracity of the banks documents and the claims made by the banks commissioned sales forces. Indeed, some have actually charged the ombudsman with talking to investors who lost their savings and in several radical cases, believing the word of a lowly common client over that of the banks commissioned sales person.

Medical staff tells us it will be some time before we know if the ombudsman will survive his injuries. While the powerless neighbourhood watch (investor advocates) keep a vigil at the hospital bedside of the ombudsman; the power, wealth and sheer overpowering influence of the gangs continues to threaten any recovery. Amid rumours that the gangs are looking at appointing their own “gang controlled” ombudsman to fill the void they are attempting to create; government and regulatory officials appear to be keeping a very low profile. Apparently the gang is so powerful even the government is leery of challenging their tantrum.

Back to you in the mainstream media for our next follow up on this troubling story......


Friday, July 29, 2011

Why Canadian Fund Investors are Confused

Canadian fund owners have every reason to be confused.....and it is likely to be getting worse not better! The average investor often makes the assumption that they just don’t have the time to sort things out, when in fact the industry is ensuring the investor does NOT sort things out. The basic information required by investors is either completely lacking or is provided in a format that cannot or will not be understood by investors.

-          Ask why we pay higher fees on Mutual Funds than other countries and you get a resigned shrug of the shoulders. Ask the fund companies and they will assure you 1% and 3% are the same fee really! (Canada ranks last in fund fees on virtually every international study)

-          Ask why salespeople who sell funds are called “advisors” and not “salespeople” and you get a shrug. (Industry lobbyists pushed for changes to use other terms in regulatory requirements and the salespeople call themselves "advisors" which means nothing)

-          Ask why so many Canadian investors purchase funds on a deferred sales charge basis and you get a funny look, like “what is that?” from the investor who has bought the punitive DSC option of a fund. (check your statement for initials such as DSC, or BEL beside your fund name; some countries just regulate there can be no DSC fees, which solves the problem)

-          Ask how much an investor is paying each month, quarter, or year to have their funds managed and the investor shrugs. Even the GST/HST fees are hidden for some reason? (government complicity allows fund firms to hide HST fees so investors cannot calculate their MER fees)

-          Ask how a fund can lose money and yet still issue tax slips for dividends, capital gains, and interest supposedly received by the investor, and you get a shrug.

-           Ask what the annual rate of return on an investor’s portfolio is and you get a shrug. (funds advertise their performance when it suits them but will not tell you your fund performance....can you guess why?)

-          Ask how you’re fund has performed against the relative benchmark for the last month, quarter, year etc, and you will get a shrug. (SPIVA reports consistently show funds perform very poorly against passive index strategies)

-          Ask how a balanced fund can be called “balanced” when it rarely is a 50%/50% split between equity and fixed income and almost always holds more equity holdings. Many investors actually believe balanced means “equally balanced”! (International rules define the amount of allowable asset mix in a fund that is balanced) you can see the list of reasons to be confused can be quite high for a typical Canadian trying to invest their RRSP and/or TFSA into something paying more than 0.10% annual interest. Most Canadian investors wrongly blame themselves. Their thought process is that “they must be too busy to understand all the information they get”, or perhaps “they just do not have the interest or aptitude for investing”. In fact, the real reason investors do not comprehend answers to the above concerns is because the information is being withheld by the manufacturers and sales people. That’s right; information is not unknown to the fund firms and sales people. It is simply withheld from the paying client! Apparently we are too “simple” to understand the information or explanations.

In fact the fund industry has a policy of ensuring the language in fund information documents does not exceed the comprehension level of a child in grade six! No, I could not make that up folks! This is official policy! (National Instrument 81-101; Section 4.1 (3) (f) requires the document not to exceed a grade 6 reading level on ...).

So, why do I say it is getting worse?  While foreign securities regulators continue to advance the requirements for transparency, Canadian regulators continue to lose ground with newer and dumber approaches to fund disclosures! The next blog will discuss the new “risk” disclosure approach recommended for Canadian funds. It is misguided, misleading, and another fund industry sham supported by what appears to be a totally out of touch and disinterested regulatory body! Here is a clue to how bad this new risk disclosure is.....the same fund manager managing two identical versions of the same fund can have the identical funds ranked at two different risk levels depending on who is sponsoring the fund. Apparently, risk is just a state of mind!

Sois mike

Saturday, July 9, 2011


Is the Truth Good Enough? I think not!

One of the great challenges for all investors (and especially DIY investors) is determining what information you should accept as truthful and valid. All information is provided from a specific perspective by the source of the information. This blog is no exception!
The easiest part of the process may be determining if information is factually true. If I say “the ETF symbol XIU is a broad based Canadian Equity fund with a MER of 0.17%”, you can determine if that is true quite easily by checking the iShares site or better yet, by reading the prospectus for XIU. Of course, other information can be more challenging to validate. If I stated “the XIU was the most liquid Canadian Equity ETF” or “the lowest cost EFT”, that would require you to do a little more research (it is not the lowest cost but is arguably the most liquid Canadian Equity ETF based upon the liquidity of the underlying securities and daily trade volumes).

OK, if we assume you accept my comments on XIU as being accurate; you then need to ask yourself “why would I believe this blog or any argument it may present with respect to the information provided?” It may be that you have validated the accuracy of previous blogs or it may be that you have checked for confirmation from another source you trust. The important thing is that you do not just assume the information is correct or the correct information is being presented in a proper context. For example, if I stated “you should always buy XIU for your portfolio because it is the most liquid Canadian Equity ETF” then I am using accurate liquidity information to support an improper suggestion. Strong liquidity is not a compelling argument on its own for you to select an ETF for your portfolio.

Ask yourself some critical questions: what association or affiliation does the blogger (Mike) have with iShares? Does he sell the security for profit? Does he own shares in iShares parent company? Is he trying to induce you to pay for advice by providing some basic facts to build trust with you? Is he an amateur “wannabe” advisor playing on the internet from his basement apartment? (In the interests of full disclosure: I do not sell or recommend any securities and carry no license to do so, I do not own shares of iShares parent company {I do own some units of XIU in my portfolio}, I do not solicit clients via my blog, I have a BA from UWO with a major in economics, hold a FMA designation from the Canadian Securities Institute and have 27 years experience working with major Canadian financial institutions.)

Assuming we can accept that I have no obvious conflict of interest in making the above comments about XIU and that I have sufficient experience to suggest the data is likely correct; the challenge becomes determining why I shared the comments and whether I am might be unknowingly passing along inaccurate assumptions. Given the above disclosures, my motives are likely somewhat more pure than an industry originated blog. Given my experience I should know what is accurate and what data is not trustworthy.....right?
The investment world, more so than most others, is filled with people who write with conviction about investments that they do not understand. Most advisors do not read a prospectus before selling a fund or stock offering. Information that is passed along is second, third, and often fourth hand by the time it reaches an investor. An analyst might work for a major bank and recommend stock “” for a portfolio. The analyst then shares the report with the senior executives who decide to pass the recommendation to the company’s advisors. The advisors then receive a “hot sheet” with a number of analyst recommendations, including In order to support the recommendation a small sales blurb is included with the hot sheet and this is what the advisor reads. The advisor is looking to make a sale so they approach clients with the recommendation, often pretending to have researched the stock and determined that it is the most suitable for the investor. The challenge for the investor is that the motives and skill of the analyst, bank brokerage executives and the advisor are all built into the risk of the investment. If we lift the hood on the whole process and peer inside we might see the following:

The bank is trying to win business from as a securities advisor, commercial lender, or corporate banker. They approach the analyst and suggest a strong recommendation might help our sales pitch. The analyst reviews the company, and not finding any major problems and knowing the banks business plans; the analyst uses some extra positive adjectives to ramp up excitement about ABC stock as an investment. The bank executives love the report and strongly suggest the advisors jump on this opportunity as supported by the analyst report. The advisor, looking for a security to sell, reads the sales blurb from the tip sheet and feels comfortable selling the securities of ABC because a top analyst has recommended the firm and the tip sheet sounds very positive on the future of ABC. The investor is overwhelmed by the opportunity as described by the advisor, recommended by the bank, and supported by a respected analyst. The analyst has a CFA designation and plenty of experience. The bank executives see no obvious problems with ABC and benefit from accepting the analyst report and adding their full support to the recommendation. The advisor trusts the firm he works for and feels the analyst must have done the hard research before making such a positive recommendation. The analyst gains positive stature and a reputation for being dependable from his companies senior executives. The executives get a positive reception from the management of ABC when they suggest their services to ABC at a significant revenue gain for the bank. The advisor gets a positive story they can sell to investors about a stock the investor will likely buy thus generating commissions for the advisor. Nobody lied to anybody. No factually incorrect statements will be made to anybody. Everybody feels good and has benefited..... With one exception. The investor has bought a mediocre stock based upon marketing hype that is not supported by ABC’s relative strength as an investment. While nothing is “wrong” with ABC, it is just not the best option the investor could have bought. There is no way for the investor to know what motives were behind the recommendation and it is difficult to point to other securities you might have bought a year or two after the fact when ABC has lagged the market by a few per cent. It might even have gained in value versus the book value.
Solution: So, “buyers beware” is the key when investors receive advice from ANYBODY! Check multiple sources. How many analysts are following ABC and how many of those rate ABC as a strong buying opportunity? Ask the advisor the right questions: have you read the full analysis yourself, what are the key risks outlined, is your bank soliciting business or doing business with ABC and how did you confirm that, what other securities did you consider and why is ABC a better choice, why do I need another stock in my portfolio and why this sector of the market at this point in the business cycle?
As my good friend Joe always says.....”It is good to trust but safer to not trust”! That translates to “trust but always verify” when you are an investor!

Saturday, June 4, 2011

Part 3b) ETF Strategies

Following up on the passive/passive discussion in the previous blog, the focus of this blog will be on the DIY investor and the passive approach.  Keeping with proper investment protocols we first look at the Investment Policy Statement or , as it is commonly known, the IPS.

Investment Policy Statement: As a general rule, if you do not have a written investment policy statement, you do not have an investment strategy. If you do not have an investment strategy you are not an investor. So what are you? If you are managing your own investments, likely you are either 1- a gambler who unknowingly takes risk in the markets; or 2- you are frustrated and often find yourself frozen and not knowing what to do next.   The vast majority of investors without an IPS are “customers”! They trusted an advisor/planner and thought that they had a strategy. They are caught in the overlapping active/active or active/no strategy categories and are seeing modest market returns eaten up by excessive active management fees (well, not actually seeing that happen as most fees are hidden, but you know what I mean).
Developing an IPS is a blog for the future so for now suffice to say, you need to know your asset allocation targets and ranges. Specifically, what percentage of cash, fixed income, equities and any other asset classes you wish to use in constructing your portfolio. In our basic passive/passive strategy  we will fill the asset requirements with broad based ETF Index funds.

Example only.

Money market account, high interest savings acct
Fixed Income
1-5 year bond ladder or GIC ladder, Dex Universal Bond Index, Corporate bond index, government bond index
Canadian Equity
TSX 60, TSX Composite Index
U.S. Equity
Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P 500, Russell 2000
International Equity
EAFE, World Index (ex North America)


The above is an example of a "basic broad based passive strategy" that would be fairly easy to build with common broad based and low cost ETF Index funds.  The characteristics of this strategy are very positive: low management expense costs, very low trading cost, low tax impact (due mainly to the low trade characteristics of Index funds), broad diversification, and high liquidity. In fact this basic approach will meet the needs of the vast majority of investors and very likely out- performs an existing mutual fund portfolio over time.
While the broad based strategy is highly recommended, it does also have its weak points.

1-      The risk level in a broad based strategy has a beta of one. That level of risk is too high for some investors. As a general rule, if the risk is too high you can lower the equity components (which reduces return and risk), or you can reduce diversification by adding lower beta securities such as replacing part of a broad based index with a lower risk sector fund having a beta of less than one. ( a utilities sector fund might have a beta of approximately 0.5%)

2-      Broad based strategies generally will have less income potential than a dividend focused equity fund. Again, the solutions seem obvious (add a dividend fund) but the consequence is reduced diversification and overweight holdings as the dividend fund replicates a portion of the broader index fund.

3-      While the strategy is low tax, it is not the lowest possible tax strategy. For those willing to sacrifice some of the benefits of the broad based portfolio, you can pay for securities that offer greater tax relief, such as "corporate class funds".

A Word On Tax Strategies:
ETPs have a very useful tax profile for higher income earners. In fact, after fees and performance benefits, the tax benefits are the next  best feature of exchange traded products (ETPs). Most investors in active Mutual Funds do not understand how tax inefficient mutual funds often are. Funds are legally established as trusts and as such are required to flow through income to the unit holders (you). Each active trade has the spin off outcome of generating a) trade costs charged to the fund, b) a capital gain or loss recorded on the fund tax slips. As well, stocks held in the funds spin off dividends that are also recorded on your annual tax slip. With active funds often trading 50-100% of the securities they hold each year, these tax events are very common regardless of whether the fund is making any market gains or not. When funds face high redemption levels securities are sold and again generate capital gains and losses to all fund holders. As you can see, structurally active mutual funds are not able to remain very tax efficient.
ETNs are even more tax efficient as they entail use of contracts that reflect dividend payouts but do not actually receive nor distribute dividends to unit holders. The dividend value is reflected in the "contract" maturity value of the fund. The value of dividends are treated as a distributed capital gain only upon the sale of the units or contract maturity date. For high income investors looking to defer taxes and earn income as tax favoured capital gains, the ETN is a great security. Obviously if you are seeking income via dividend distributions, these notes are not for you. ETNs also carry default risk not generally associated with typical ETFs.

Cautions: Tax strategies are often a means of disguising poor investments as a “strategy”. Who has not been burned by “labour sponsored funds” sold strictly as a tax strategy!

ETPs As Portfolio Insurance

When discussing ETPs it is good to remember that many of the strategies are used by professional traders and portfolio managers. As “exchange traded” securities, you can trade ETPs on the stock exchange. That means you can “short” the securities or you can buy inverse versions of many ETFs. For professionals that may result in long/short strategies where, as an example, a trader buys a stock long (say RBC) and then shorts the financial sector. This attempts to select the winners (RBC)  and discount the less attractive sector players (the other major banks), thus removing market risk from the final trade outcome.
Portfolio Insurance: If an investor has a large net gain in a Canadian stock portfolio, they want to protect the gains but may not want to sell the securities and face a capital gain tax. In this scenario the investor might short the Canadian market ETF to insure their capital gains against a market drop. If the market, including the investor's securities, drops 10% then they make up for the stock losses with the gains on the short position. Rather than buying a short position against every stock held, the investor could simply short the broad based stock index using an ETF Index fund.

Interest Rate Anticipation Strategies: A number of investors are concerned about interest rates rising and hurting returns on fixed income portfolios. Within the ETP product scope, investors can customize interest rate sensitivity (measured by duration) by mixing fixed income ETFs with a variety of durations. Purchasing a Dex Universal ETF Index is the broadest based Canadian bond index fund. By mixing in a ladder strategy (Claymore has popular laddered ETFs) or using the BMO Index funds, an investor can mix long, short and medium term Fixed Income ETFs. By doing so you can shorten the duration and thus lower the interest rate sensitivity of the fixed income holdings.
ETF Passive/Passive: The "broad based strategy" outlined in the chart provided, is the preferred approach for most DIY investors. It is a simple approach with few securities and few moving parts for an investor to monitor. While variations exist, an ETF Index portfolio utilizing 5 funds remains the most basic strategy with the greatest diversification and the most bang for your buck.

Some investors use this as a core strategy within a "Core & Explore" portfolio. With the bulk of the portfolio in the well diversified broad ETF strategy, the "explore" portion of the portfolio (10-20% as an example) can pursue other strategies without tilting risk too far off the intended levels. This approach works well for those that want to mix a little personal stock picking or additional diversification (say gold bullion) into the portfolio, without letting the riskier components distort the overall strategy.
That wraps up the basic ETF review discussed in the last four blogs. Hope it helps you better understand the ETP world!